Sections

Introduction

IW Structures: China

IW Structures: United States

IW Structures: Russia

IW Structures: Pakistan

References

Introduction

The primary focus of this four part series is to suggest Information Warfare (IW) structures for the Indian Armed Forces which are effective enough to match up to the challenges of 21st Century warfare. Part I dwelt upon terminologies, concepts and doctrines, and identified CO, EW and Psy W as the three primary components of IW. Part II analysed the areas of convergence as well as differences amongst these components, as also various facets of how these capabilities may be operationally deployed in an integrated manner.

With the conceptual underpinnings of IW having been established, here we endeavour to briefly describe IW structures which presently exist in some of the defense forces of the world which are of relevance to us, with a view to drawing lessons and thence analysing our own against this backdrop.

IW Structures: China

Concept

The Chinese Strategic Support Force (SSF) was created as part of the reforms which were initiated by the PLA in 2015 [1]. These reforms brought in noteworthy changes in the structure, warfighting methods and organizational structure of the PLA, all of which are reflected in the concept and character of the SSF. The integration of strategic space, cyber, electronic and psychological warfare capabilities, earlier controlled by the General Staff Department (GSD), General Armament Department (GAD) and General Political Department (GPD) of the Central Military Commission (CMC), under the single umbrella of the SSF gives an insight into how the PLA plans to fight informationized wars of the 21st Century. One of the key Chinese warfighting concepts which the SSF operationalizes at the strategic level is Integrated Network Electronic Warfare (INEW).

Prior to the PLA’s reorganization, space, cyber, and EW units were organized according to mission type – disciplines of reconnaissance, attack, or defense – rather than their warfighting domain. By re-organising space, cyber, EW and psychological warfare capabilities at the strategic level under a single jurisdiction, the SSF possesses the capability of efficiently fulfilling the two important roles of providing “strategic information support” and carrying out “strategic information operations”. Such a re-organisation also implies that space, cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum are being treated as warfighting domains in their own right, rather than supporting elements in the traditional land, sea and air domains [2].

It is to be noted that cyber and EW responsibilities are also shared by the Network-Electronics Bureau (NEB), which is part of the Joint Staff Department (JSD) of the Central Military Commission (CMC). In addition, there are cyber and EW elements placed under the theatre commands as well. Finally, cyber defence of networks is not entirely with the SSF, with responsibility for this being shared with the Information and Communication Bureau, which too is part of the JSD (JSD-ICB). This Bureau also handles the “Intelligence” function for strategic decision making, which notably is not within the ambit of the SSF. The exact division of responsibilities between the JSD and SSF to fulfill the cyber and EW missions is not yet very clear. Finally, while some aspects of psychological warfare have evidently been shifted to the SSF, the other two components of “Three Warfares”, ie, legal warfare and public opinion warfare, fall outside the SSF’s charter.

Organisation

The SSF comprises of two operational departments, namely, the Space Systems Department (SSD) and the Network Systems Department (NSD). The former controls nearly every aspect of PLA space operations, including space launch and support; telemetry, tracking, and control; information support; and space warfare, while the latter is responsible for cyber, electronic and psychological warfare. In addition, amongst its first-level departments, the SSF has a standard four-department administrative structure that includes the SSF Staff Department, Equipment Department, Political Work Department, and a Logistics Department. Administratively, the SSF operates in a manner similar to the PLA Second Artillery Force (re-organized now as the PLA Rocket Force (PLARF)), which was organizationally a hybrid between a force and a service, with its strategic capabilities directly under the control of the CMC [3].

Strategic Support Force: Organisation

The SSD and the NSD function mostly independently, and although the Staff Department serves as the operational headquarters of the SSF, all three departments have the same grade. Such an arrangement is possibly adopted to enable the SSD and NSD to independently prioritize and develop their cadre, capabilities, training programs and other force needs, and at the same time allow the CMC to integrate their missions whenever such a need arises.

SSD and NSD: Missions

Under the respective departments, the SSF appears to be organized as “bases”, many of which existed as part of the pre-reform structure. For instance, five of the former GAD “test bases” responsible for space operations have been transferred to the SSF, as is also the case with the 311 Base, China’s “Three Warfares” base known to have the exclusive mandate for psychological operations, which was earlier under the GPD.

Organisational structures with respect to cyber, EW and psychological warfare capabilities are elaborated upon further in the following sections, which dwell on these capabilities in some detail.

Information Operations

SSF’s NSD which, perhaps because of its nomenclature, is often referred to as the “cyber operations force,” has in fact been empowered with capabilities for carrying out information operations in a wider sense, encompassing cyber warfare, EW and potentially, psychological warfare missions as well.

Network Systems Department: Organisation

Cyber Operations

NSD is responsible for PLA’s cyber exploit/ espionage missions as also for cyber-attack missions [4]. Such an integration reflects the felt operational need for close coordination between these two missions as well as the commonality of expertise required for carrying them out. In all likelihood all the 12 Technical Reconnaissance Bureaus (TRBs), which were known to be responsible for cyber exploit/ espionage [5] as well as signal intelligence (SIGINT) missions, have been transferred to the NSD for carrying out cyber operations. It is also expected that elements integral to the GSD’s Fourth Department, which were trained for carrying out cyber-attack missions, have also been transferred to the NSD, perhaps by integrating these into the TRBs. In addition, the 56th, 57th and 58th Research Institutes (RIs), which are known to possess the R&D and weaponization expertise for cyber as well as SIGINT missions, have also been placed under the NSD. Lastly, the PLA Information Engineering University has been moved to the NSD for enabling the necessary cadre development. The charter for cyber defense [6], on the other hand, remains primarily with the JSD-ICB, as brought out above [7].

EW Operations

China’s Strategic EW mission was earlier the well-defined charter of GSD’s Fourth Department [8]. Post re-structuring, this departmental headquarter has been re-constituted to raise the new JSD-NEB, which would likely exert control over all INEW missions across the Chinese military, including the SSF, theatre commands and the services. However, it is expected that the electronic attack/ counter-measure (EA/ ECM) brigades, detachments and stations under control of the former Fourth Department, have been moved to the NSD for carrying out strategic EA missions. As stated above, the 12 TRBs placed under the NSD possess the capability to carry out ES missions. The GSD’s 54th RI, responsible for R&D on EA and CNA, has been transferred to the SSF. Of the military academic institutions related to EW, the Luoyang Foreign Language Institute has been moved to the NSD while the Fourth Department’s PLA Electrical Engineering Institute has been placed under the National University of Defense Technology (NUDT) for human resource development on EW. The responsibility for electronic protect (EP)/ electronic counter-counter measures (ECCM) is expected to lie with the JSD-ICB, as is the case with respect to cyber defence.

Three Warfares and Psychological Operations

In 2003 the CCP Central Committee and the CMC adopted the PLA information warfare concept of the Three Warfares. Based on literature available on the subject, the US Department of Defense (DoD) has described the three components of this concept as follows [9]:-

• Psychological Warfare seeks to undermine an enemy’s ability to conduct combat operations through operations aimed at deterring, shocking, and demoralizing enemy military personnel and supporting civilian populations.
• Media Warfare is aimed at influencing domestic and international public opinion to build support for China’s military actions and dissuade an adversary from pursuing actions contrary to China’s interests.
• Legal Warfare uses international and domestic law to claim the legal high ground or assert Chinese interests. It can be used to thwart an opponent’s operational freedom and shape the operational space. It is also used to build international support and manage possible political repercussions of China’s military.

In the pre-reform era, the responsibility for the conduct of Three Warfares, also termed broadly as political warfare, was entrusted to the GPD. Within the GPD, political warfare at the strategic level was handled by the GPD’s Liaison Department, while at the operational level the execution of this concept was carried out by the 311 Base along with its six subordinate regiments, all of which were placed under the command of the GPD.

Subsequent to the re-structuring, the GPD has taken the form of the new CMC Political Work Department, while the 311 Base has been shifted to the SSF. Within the SSF, although the location of the 311 Base is as yet not confirmed, it is expected to be either under the SSF Political Work Department or, more likely, under the NSD. Such a re-structuring was presumably aimed at achieving the following effects [10]:-

• Since the PLA is inherently a party army and not a national one, one of its imperatives is to ensure ideological loyalty amongst its cadre and propagate party ideals. This aspect will now fall within the purview of the new CMC-PWD, while the operational effects of Three Warfares across the entire spectrum of conflict would be the responsibility of the SSF, thus achieving a decoupling between party and military requirements.
• The close integration of all elements of information operations (cyber, EW and psychological warfare) under the SSF, and if 311 Base has indeed been allocated to the NSD, within the NSD, will enable a much more effective and synergized information warfare campaign, closely aligned with all the other operational forces, than was possible under the siloed structures existing in the pre-reform era.

IW Structures: United States

US IO Doctrine

The US DoD IO Doctrine of 2006 designated EW, Psychological Operations (PSYOP), Computer Network Operations (CNO)/ CO, Military Deception (MILDEC) and Operational Security (OPSEC) as Core Capabilities, in addition to several others as Supporting and Related Capabilities [11], while its IO Doctrine of 2012/14 enunciates the concept of Information Related Capabilities (IRCs), encompassing all IO capabilities into this single category [12]. Interestingly, there is a RAND study which recommends that better conceptual clarity and functional effectiveness may be achieved if IO is split into two functional areas, namely, Information Technical Operations (ITO) and Inform and Influence Operations (IIO), with the former focussing on the information domain with machines as targets (CO and EW), and the latter on the psychological/ cognitive domain with people as targets [13]. US DoD has also promulgated a separate doctrine on CO, as also on several other IO capabilities [14, 15, 16, 17, 18]. It formally declared Cyberspace as an operational domain of warfare as early as the year 2011. The US Army’s concept of Cyber Electro-Magnetic Activities (CEMA), is reflective of the strong convergence between the CO and EW functions.

Cyber Operations

United States Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) is one of the eleven unified commands of the DoD. It unifies the direction of cyberspace operations, strengthens DoD cyberspace capabilities, and integrates and bolsters DoD’s cyber expertise. Each of the four Services have their own cyber components, namely, the Army Cyber Command, the Fleet Cyber Command (10th Fleet), the 16th Air Force and the Marine Corps Cyberspace Command. The concept of CEMA has been adopted by the US Army, which it implements through its CEMA teams [19].

The US Cyber Command achieved initial operational capability in 2010. It comprises of 133 Cyber Mission Teams with a total strength of 6200 personnel. A good proportion of these teams are distributed amongst the geographical commands to be deployed at operational and tactical levels. In Aug 2018, the Cyber Command has been upgraded to the status of a unified combatant command by the Trump administration [20].

EW Policy and Structure

The EW Executive Committee, led by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, is tasked with synchronizing and integrating EW across all DoD components by sharing tactics, techniques, procedures, intelligence, and technologies. Vide DoD Directive No 3222.04 of 2014 (updated in 2018), while Combatant Commands are responsible for execution of EW as part of integrated operations, the US Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) has the mandate for advocacy of EW capabilities across doctrine, organisation, training and equipment in conjunction with the Combatant Commands, except in the case of special operations, EW capabilities for which are coordinated by the US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) [21].

The congressionally mandated National Defense Strategy Commission has stated that the US is losing its advantages in EW vis-à-vis China and Russia, hindering the nation’s ability to conduct military operations against capable adversaries. The Commission recommended increasing EW investments and developing new concepts to regain US military advantage. Each service has incorporated EW capabilities into platforms and combat systems and is currently working to modernize its existing capabilities. The FY 2019 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) mandated the creation of an EW Cross Functional Team to develop an EW strategy, including assessments of vulnerabilities and capability gaps, leading to an acquisition plan. The most recent DoD EW strategy was released in 2017. The FY 2017 NDAA directed DOD to develop and release a new strategy to the Congress [22].

Psychological Operations

The DoD active components mandated to carry out psychological operations are placed under the US Special Operations Command. These components are the 4th & 8th Psychological Operations Groups, each comprising of 3-4 Psychological Operations battalions. There are a number of reserve components tasked to carry out psychological operations, which are part of the Army, Air Force and Navy. The Marine Corps does not have any component with the sole charter related to psychological operations, either as active or reserve components. The overall psychological operations structure for the US DoD is given out below.

US Psychological Operations: Force Structure

US Space Command

US Space Command (USSPACECOM) is a unified combatant command of the US DoD, responsible for military operations in outer space. US Space Command was originally created in September 1985 to provide joint command and control for the US Armed Forces in outer space, but was inactivated in 2002. US Space Command was re-established as on 29 August 2019, due to an increased focus on military space operations.

US Space Command has two subordinate components. While the Combined Force Space Component Command uses “space assets to provide effects to the warfighting units across the globe, the Joint Task Force-Space Defense has the responsibility to protect and defend space assets from both terrestrial and space-based threats [23].

IW Structures: Russia

IW Doctrine

Russian IW doctrine focusses on Information as the central theme, and does not have Cyberspace in its IW lexicon. Russian doctrine too shows a preference for classifying IW disciplines under the two major subdivisions of Information-Technical Warfare and Information-Psychological Warfare, concepts which are similar to the US ITO and IIO referred to above [24].

Information Operations

For many years, cyber operations in Russia were the exclusive domain of the state’s security services. The Federal Security Service (FSB), appears to be the Federation’s lead actor for coordinating cyber propaganda and disinformation campaigns. It also maintains and operates SORM, the State’s internal cyber surveillance system. The Federal Service for Supervision in the Sphere of Telecommunications, Information Technologies and Mass Communication, which is responsible for overseeing the media, including the electronic media, and mass communications, information technology and telecommunications), controls information blacklists and regulates the media.

Directorate K of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) focuses on cyber-crime. For a brief period in the 1990s, Russia had a separate information security agency, the Federal Agency for Government Communications and Information (FAPSI). In 2003, however, FAPSI was disbanded, and its components were absorbed into the FSB, the MVD, the Federal Protective Service of the Russian Federation (FSO RF), and the SVR, Russia’s foreign intelligence service. Together, these agencies have established the parameters of Russian cyber doctrine and been responsible for coordinating most of the state’s internal and external cyber operations.

By contrast, the military’s cyber remit was, until recently, limited to those areas where cyber overlaps with the field of EW. However, this changed somewhat in the wake of Russia’s conflict with Georgia in 2008. Although the conflict resulted in a victory for Russia’s forces, it also exposed serious operational and organizational deficiencies, including in the area of information operations. As a result, the Ministry of Defense (MOD) announced, along with other military reforms, that it would establish a branch in the military responsible for conducting information operations, complete with specially trained and equipped troops.

According to one source, these troops would include hackers, journalists, specialists in strategic communications and psychological operations, and, crucially, linguists to overcome Russia’s now perceived language capability deficit. This combination of skills would enable the Information Troops to engage with target audiences on a broad front, since for information warfare objectives the use of “mass information armies” conducting a direct dialogue with people on the Internet is more effective than a “mediated” dialogue between the leaders of states and the peoples of the world. The FSB, resented the military’s intrusion onto its turf, and publicly opposed the initiative. The idea did not die, however, and in 2013, the government announced that it would be creating a cyber unit in the military whose responsibilities would include offensive and defensive cyber operations, as well as a cyber research and development agency, called the Foundation for Advanced Military Research. Although it sought to complete the staggered formation of these military cyber units by 2017, their current status is unknown. According to Moscow-based sources, the military is having trouble recruiting qualified applicants for its cyber forces. Over the long term, however, if the Russian military manages to successfully develop its own organic offensive cyber capabilities, the result could be an increasing use of cyber to support conventional military operations.

EW Organisations

At the apex level, HQ EW Troops is located within the General Staff in Moscow. With the creation of the EW Troops, EW Services[RSP1] (EW command bodies found throughout the military organization) have acquired a more central role. For example, EW matters in the Ground Forces were previously not a domain in their own right, but instead handled as part of the Ground Forces reconnaissance units. This changed with the reinstatement of the EW Service in the Ground Forces in 2013.

Overview of EW Structure in the Russian Armed Forces

EW Services have also recently been created in the Airborne Troops. EW Services represent the main link between HQ EW Troops and other subordinate EW assets. Very few organizations are directly subordinated to the EW Troops. In this category are the 1084th inter-service EW training centre and the 15th independent EW brigade, both of which are located in the city of Tambov.

At present, EW tasks are carried out by at least three directorates, one department and one service. The main role of the EW Troops command structure is the long-term build-up and development of military EW assets. In addition, it administers everyday matters concerning EW and the EMS that are of importance to the Russian Armed Forces. These include organizing protection against foreign technical reconnaissance, ensuring electromagnetic compatibility, and responsibility for international legal issues concerning the protection of military radio electronic systems. EW Troops is currently headed by a two-star general officer.

The distribution of EW units is multifaceted and there is no obvious way to categorize EW assets. There are EW units at all operational levels. Some have a multitude of EW tasks while others have a highly specialized role. In general, an EW company supports a brigade, an EW battalion supports a Division and an EW brigade supports a Corps size force.

IW Structures: Pakistan

Cyber Operations

Policy. In Jul 2019, Dr. Khalid Maqbool Siddiqui, the Pakistan Minister for Information Technology stated that work on developing a new cyber security policy is in the final stages [25]. However, information in the open domain suggests that Pakistan does not have a national cybersecurity strategy document till date. However, the latest National Internal Security Policy (NISP) 2018-2023, focusses attention on securing cyberspace. The policy envisages the formulation of a national cyber security strategy, establishment of civil-military cyber command force, strengthening of the cyber-crimes wing at the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) and the cyber security wing at National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA), alongside creating public awareness about cyber security threats [26].

Prevention of Electronic Crime Act (PECA) 2016. On the legal front, specific legislation and regulation related to cybersecurity have been enacted through the Prevention of Electronic Crime Act (PECA) 2016 which extends to the whole country. The government has designated the FIA Cyber-Wing to investigate offences under the Act, but it lacks capacity to respond and investigate modern cyber-attacks.

National Response Centre for Cyber Crime (NR3C). The Pakistan National Response Centre for Cyber Crime (NR3C) is a law enforcement agency dedicated to fight cyber-crime. NR3C has expertise in Digital Forensics, Technical Investigation, Information System Security Audits, Penetration Testing and Training [27].

Pakistan Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT). Pakistan lacks an officially recognized agency certified under internationally recognized standards for handling cyber incidents. However, PakCERT and Pakistan Information Security Association (PISA)-CERT are two public sector information security companies that provide information security services and training to help the public, government and private sector build a secure information infrastructure [28, 29]. A draft presented before the Senate of Pakistan on April 14, 2014 titled “National Cyber Security Council Act, 2014” called for the establishment of a national CERT under public-private partnership, as also sector-specific CERTs. However, that draft has not yet seen the light of day [30].

Cyberspace Management. Apart from the cybercrime bill there is no clear cut policy on the subject of cyber security. The mandate of the NR3C is limited and it lacks the wherewithal to act as first responder in case of a computer emergency in cyberspace. There is no mechanism for interstate understanding or sharing of best practices on regional basis, neither is Pakistan part of any collaboration on cyber security issues in the South Asian region [31].

Cyberspace Capabilities in the Armed Forces. Although very little information is available in the open domain on cyberspace capabilities within the Pakistan Armed Forces, it can be surmised that suitable cyber security procedures, including air-gapping of defence networks, are being followed by the three Services. On the other hand, there are no organisations which have been raised or are in the offing with the mandate for carrying out offensive cyber operations, neither is there any declared cyber operations strategy either at the joint services or individual service levels.

EW Operations

EW Philosophy. For strategic assets, due to their scarcity, the EW philosophy of Pakistan Army is based on “centralised control and decentralised employment.” Most resources are decentralised to the level of a corps, limited tactical ranges being one of the factors influencing this decision. During offensive operations, integration of resources and their coordinated employment between holding and strike corps is envisaged, while during defensive operations, synergy is attempted with surveillance resources and HUMINT to arrive at an electronic order of battle.

Organisation. Pakistani EW organisation at the apex level is as under:-

Pakistan’s EW Organisation Structure

A brief overview of the each of the above components is as under:-

• Inter-Services Signal Units (ISSUs). These are similar to our Wireless Experimental Units (WEUs) with interception and direction finding (DF) capabilities.
• Satellite Interception Organisation. Pakistan EW capabilities include interception of Inmarsat, very small aperture terminals (VSATs) as well as the INSAT system.
• Army Light Radio Group (ALRG). The ALRG provides EW support at command level as well as to strike formations. It comprises of two EW Signal Battalions, which operate discrete tactical jammers and integrated communication EW systems (CEWS).
• Signal Combat Support Groups (SCSUs). The nine SCSUs provide EW support to holding corps and carry out interception, DF and jamming forward of divisional headquarters by establishing Radio Operating Centres (ROCs), which are deployed all along the western front.

Psychological Warfare Capabilities

Doctrine and Organisation. There is no declared Pakistani strategy or doctrine on psychological operations. Further, there are no military units in the Pakistan Armed Forces specifically tasked for psychological operations. However, unlike India, it does have an effective tri-Services Directorate of Inter-Service Public Relations (ISPR) with objectives specified across the spectrum of conflict. Another obscure think tank, namely, Command Eleven, also plays a significant role in furthering the psychological operations objectives of its Armed Forces.

Directorate of Inter-Service Public Relations (ISPR). The Pakistani Armed Forces operate a unified public relations system for its Defence Forces through the ISPR Directorate. The Directorate was established in 1949 and is staffed with personnel from all the three Services alongside a large number of civilian officers. ISPR’s primary aim is to ensure information superiority and protect troops from effects of propaganda, misinformation and rumours, and it has well laid out objectives and roles during war and counter-insurgency operations [32]. It functions as a part of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Secretariat and its purpose is to garner national support for the Armed Forces and strengthen their resolve to accomplish the assigned mission while undermining the will of the adversary. It also acts as an interface between the Armed Forces, the media and the public. It formulates much of the media policy of Pakistan’s military, safeguards the Armed Forces from negative influences and monitors both international and domestic media. The director-general directly reports to Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Secretariat, Chief of Pakistani Army. He is also responsible to the Chief of Air Force, Commandant of the Marines, the Chief of Naval Staff and of the Coast Guard [33].

Command Eleven. Another infamous player in Islamabad’s psychological operations effort is ‘Command Eleven’. This organisation is not officially a part of the Pakistan Army or its intelligence apparatus. Command Eleven, despite having no official ties with the Pakistani government, is said to be one of the ISI’s premier black propaganda outfits. This shadowy organisation is a mysteriously funded think tank headed by retired Lieutenant General Tariq Kahan and Colonel Azam Quadri, along with a team of cyber analysts and strategic experts. Some of its members have linkages to another equally obscure think tank known as the Centre for Strategic and Contemporary Research (CSCR). Post the Pulwama attack in Feb 2019, Command Eleven is reported to be responsible for flooding the social media with fake news and videos [34].

Integrated Information Operations

There does not appear to be any cogent strategy available for integrated employment of cyber, EW and psychological warfare capabilities as part of a multi-dimensional conflict with any of its adversaries, nor does the current organizational structure within the Armed Forces support such an employment.

Conclusion

This part has briefly reviewed the IW doctrines and organisations of China, US, Russia and Pakistan. The final part of this work will first provide an overview of the IW structures which are presently in place within the Indian Armed Forces. Thereafter, drawing upon the analysis presented in the first three parts, it will endeavour to recommend transformative changes to these structures in order to meet future challenges.

References

(1)     Kenneth W. Allen, Dennis J. Blasko, John F. Corbett, Jr., The PLA’s New Organisational Structure: What is Known, Unknown and Speculation (Part I), (Washington, The Jamestown Foundation, China Brief, Volume XVI, Issue 3, 08 Feb 2016), 6.

(2)     John Costello and Joe McReynolds, China’s Strategic Support Force: A Force for a New Era, (Washington, National Defence University Press, China Strategic Perspectives, No 13, Oct 2018), 11-12.

(3)     Ibid., 13.

(4)     Cyber-attack is formally referred to as Computer Network Attack (CNA) in US/ Indian terminology.

(5)     Cyber exploit/ espionage is formally termed as Computer Network Exploit (CNE) in US/ Indian terminology.

(6)     Cyber defence is formally referred to as Computer Network Defence (CND) in US/ Indian terminology.

(7)     John Costello and Joe McReynolds, China’s Strategic Support Force: A Force for a New Era, (Washington, National Defence University Press, China Strategic Perspectives, No 13, Oct 2018), 23-25.

(8)     Strategic EW comprises of strategic Electronic Attack (EA) such as satellite jamming and strategic Electronic Support (ES) (in Indian terminology, a combination of Signal Intelligence (SI) and strategic Electronic Intelligence (ELINT)).

(9)     Office of the Secretary of Defense (DoD), Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2011, Annual Report to Congress (Washington, DC: DoD, 16 August 2011), Accessed 29 Nov 2019, https://archive.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/2011_CMPR_Final.pdf, 26.

(10)   John Castello, China’s Strategic Support Force, 28-29.

(11)   US DoD Joint Publication 3-13, Information Operations, Feb 2006, pp. II-1.

(12)   US DoD Joint Publication 3-13, Information Operations, Nov 2014.

(13)   Isaac R. Porche III et al, Redefining Information Warfare Boundaries for an Army in a Wireless World, Pub. RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, CA, pp. 42, 59.

(14)   US DoD Joint Publication 3-12 (R), Cyberspace Operations, Feb 2013.

(15)   US DoD Joint Publication 3-12, Electronic Warfare, Feb 2012.

(16)   US DoD Joint Publication 3-13.12, Military Information Support Operations, Jan 2010.

(17)   US DoD Joint Publication 3-13.2, Military Deception, Jan 2012.

(18)   US DoD Joint Publication 3-61, Public Affairs, Aug 2016.

(19)   Kimberly Underwood, Army CEMA Teams Advance Information, Electronic and Cyber Warfare, Signal, 06 Aug 2018, Accessed 29 Mar 2020, https://www.afcea.org/content/army-cema-teams-advance-information-electronic-and-cyber-warfare.

(20)   United States Cyber Command, Wikipedia, Accessed 29 mar 2020, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ United_States_Cyber_Command.

(21)   US DOD Directive 3222.04, EW Policy, 04 Mar 2014 (updated 2018), Accessed 29 Mar 2020, https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodd/322204p.pdf?ver=2019-04-29-073058-403.

(22)   Defence Primer: Electronic Warfare, US Congressional Research Service, Updated 30 Dec 2019, Accessed 29 Mar 2020, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/IF11118.pdf.

(23)   United States Space Command, Wikipedia, Accessed 29 mar 2020, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ United_States_Space_Command.

(24)   Keir Giles, Handbook of Russian IW, Fellowship Monograph No 9, NATO Defence College, Nov 2016, pp. 9, 36.

(25)   New Cybersecurity Policy to be Finalized Soon, Minister IT, Techjuice, Accessed 05 Jan 2020, https://www.techjuice.pk/new-cybersecurity-policy-to-be-finalized-soon-minister-it/.

(26)   Fahad Nabeel, National Internal Security Policy 2018-2023 – A Critical Assessment, The Daily Times, 02 Aug 2018, Accessed 11 Jan 2020, https://dailytimes.com.pk/276539/national-internal-security-policy-2018-2023-a-critical-assessment/.

(27)   About National Response Centre for Cyber Crime, NR3C Website, Accessed 11 Jan 2020, http://www.nr3c.gov.pk/about_us.html.

(28)   About Us, Pakistan Computer Emergency Response Team Company Website, Accessed 11 Jan 2020, https://www.pakcert.org/.

(29)   Raja Taimur Hassan, Cybersecurity Threats: Policy Gaps, Challenges and Way Forward, Sustainable Development Policy Institute Website, 07 Feb 2019, Accessed 11 Jan 2020, https://sdpi.org/media/media_details3703-press-2019.html.

(30)   Prospect of a Pakistani Computer Emergency Response Team, PakWired Webdesk, 02 Feb 2016, Accessed 11 Jan 2020, https://pakwired.com/prospect-of-a-pakistani-cert/.

(31)   Dr Tughral Yamin, Cyberspace Management in Pakistan, Governance and Management Review, Vol 3, No 1, 2018, pp. 55, Accessed 14 Jan 2020, http://pu.edu.pk/images/journal/IAS/PDF/4-v3_1_18.pdf.

(32)   Role Of ISPR In Handling Media, Media Essay. Essays, UK. (November 2013), Accessed 12 Jan 2020, https://www.uniassignment.com/essay-samples/media/role-of-ispr-in-handling-media-media-essay.

(33)   Col John Adache, The Military and Public Relations – Issues, Strategies and Challenges, Pub. AuthorHouse, 11 Jul 2014.

(34)   The Pakistani Disinformation Campaign Against India, GreatGameIndia, 19 Jun 2019, Accessed 12 Jan 2020, http://greatgameindia.com/the-pakistani-disinformation-campaign-against-india/.