Sections

Strategies for Indigenous Innovation

Defence R&D: Structural Reforms

Academic and Research Institutions

Noteworthy Features of the Chinese Defence R&D Enterprise

References

 

[This piece is in continuation to “China’s Approach to Defence Innovation – Part I”, which covered the background, CMI integration strategy and national S&T development plans]

Strategies for Indigenous Innovation

In addition to the CMI strategy and various national level S&T development plans, some of the important factors and strategies which are being vigorously pursued by China to give the necessary impetus and accelerate the process of defence innovation are: increased R&D funding; encouraging and recruiting researchers with the right expertise and talent; and acquisition of foreign technologies through a variety of licit and illicit means. These are briefly discussed below.

Increased R&D Funding

China is only second to the US in military spending, and has doubled its military budget during the period 2009-2018, an annual increase of 6%. In 2018, it announced a defence budget of US $170 billion (1.3% of GDP). Notwithstanding the non-transparency in China’s defence accounting procedures, actual military spending is estimated to be higher than the officially declared figures (for 2018 this estimate is US $200 billion). It is projected that a similar growth in its military expenditure will continue for at least another 5-10 years, and slow down thereafter [1].

China’s published military budget does not separately list out Defence R&D as a category. However, as per one estimate, China’s total R&D funding increased form just $3.1 billion in 1997 to an estimated $40 billion in 2013, with roughly $5 to $7 billion (approximately 15% of total R&D funding) of that dedicated to defense-related R&D. By 2016, the Chinese government was spending (in nominal terms) $70.8 billion on R&D, with much of this helping to produce dual-use technologies. Going by these figures, defence R&D funding in 2018 may be calculated to be close to US $30 billion [2].

Encouraging Research in S&T Disciplines

China has boosted efforts to train researchers at home and abroad in STEM fields. Of the over 7.4 million students who obtain a bachelor’s degree in China every year, 35% concentrate in S&T. In 2016, China conferred 2.5 million undergraduate degrees in STEM fields. In terms of doctoral degrees, China produced 32,700 Ph D recipients in STEM fields in 2017 [3].

The Thousand Talents Program

China accounts for one-third of all international students in the US, sending more than twice as many students as India, the next largest source. Many foreign doctorate students choose to remain in the US after graduation and add to the most highly trained segment of the global science and engineering workforce. Doctorate recipients from China averaged a stay rate in the US of 81.9% during the period 2011-2017, with the most recent data (2017) showing a slight increase over this period.

In recent years, however, Beijing has intensified efforts to lure back Chinese academics and attract leading non-Chinese researchers. China’s flagship Thousand Talents Program, for example, prioritizes recruiting people of Chinese descent or recent Chinese emigrants (primarily in the US) whose employment the Chinese government views as necessary to China’s scientific and technical modernization, especially with regard to defense technology. The Program specifically targets S&T experts by reducing administrative barriers and offering various incentives for researchers moving to China.

Acquisition of Foreign Technologies

China very proactively acquires and exploits foreign technologies, through an unprecedented and aggressive effort believed to be at the behest of the central Chinese government. This strategy is designed to circumvent the costs of research, and ‘leapfrog’ to the forefront of high end research by leveraging the creativity of other nations. Towards this end, in addition to the spinoffs from wooing Chinese and non-Chinese researchers trained in the US and elsewhere as discussed above, the following measures are also adopted by China [4]:-

• Imports. China imports dual-use technologies from other countries by applying for regular licences through government commerce channels.
• Foreign Direct Investment. China buys stakes in or acquires foreign companies having access to cutting edge technologies of interest to it.
• R&D Centres. China seeks partnerships in government, private and academic research establishments within and outside China in order to gain access to state-of-the-art technologies being developed by its foreign partners.
• Industrial Espionage. China resorts to traditional, and now increasingly cyber, industrial espionage to illicitly acquire technologies developed by foreign countries.

Defence R&D: Structural Reforms

In pursuance of its CMI strategy and to transform China into a powerhouse of defence innovation, several major structural reforms have been carried out by China over the last five years. The most important among these reforms are the creation of the Central Commission for Integrated Military and Civilian Development; the disbandment and reorganisation of the PLA General Armament Department into the CMS S&T Commission and the Equipment Development Division, and the establishment of the new Military Science Research Steering Committee (Chinese DARPA). These are briefly discussed in succeeding paragraphs [5].

The Central Commission for Integrated Military and Civilian Development

The Central Commission for Integrated Military and Civilian Development (CMI Commission), established in January 2017, is the primary organization driving Chinese military R&D today, for the following reasons: the Commission is set up under the CCP’s Politburo and its Standing Committee, rather than under the PLA; and even more significantly, it is chaired by President Xi Jinping himself, giving it the highest level of influence and authority.

The purpose of the CMI Commission is to serve as the central-level decision-making and coordinating body on major issues relating to the development of CMI, and to unify the CCP’s leadership over all CMI issues. It is worth mentioning here that some analysts prefer the term Military-Civil Fusion (MCF) over CMI, on the grounds that MCF is a Chinese-specific concept going beyond broader conceptions of CMI.

In 2010, the State Council and CMC jointly promulgated “Document 37,” which lists six broad areas of CMI work needing improvement, two of which relate to inadequate coordinating mechanisms and the need to deepen reform of institutional mechanisms. Despite its authoritarian nature, the Chinese system is too large for central coordination to be effective, leading to a “fragmented” governance. Several measures have been adopted by Chinese leaders to reduce the effects of this fragmentation, sometimes referred to as “cross-system integrators,” of which the CMI Commission is an excellent example. Being led by President Xi and two other Politburo Standing Committee members, the CMI Commission is well poised to successfully drive military innovation and guide overall CMI coordination and development in the coming years.

The CMC Science and Technology Commission

Before the restructuring of the PLA, the General Armaments Department (GAD) was the PLA’s chief organ in charge of performing research, development, testing, and evaluation of armaments; overseeing procurement management; and supervising the development of information systems for the PLA. In this pre-reform era, the S&T Commission was placed under the GAD. A major step taken as part of “above the neck” PLA reforms in 2016 was the disbandment of all the four PLA departments under the CMC, namely, the GAD, General Political Department, General Logistics Department, and General Armaments Department, and creation of 15 new organs in their place. In this restructured set-up, the erstwhile GAD was renamed the Equipment Development Department (EDD), and the S&T Commission was elevated to a status equal to that of the EDD as one of the 15 organs directly under the CMC.

Lt Gen Liu Guozhi was chosen as the first director of the S&T commission and still continues to hold this key post. Liu is a technical expert, not a career bureaucrat, a physicist who has worked previously on high-power microwave weapons at the Northwest Nuclear Technology Institute, and has led a career through the PLA’s weapon development system.

The elevation of the S&T Commission as an organ directly under the CMC, and the choice of Liu Guozhi, who has deep understanding of China’s strategic innovation system, as its director, reflects the high priority that the PLA leadership places on military S&T innovation.

The Military Science Research Steering Committee

The Military Science Research Steering Committee was a new secretive agency created in 2017, to report directly to the CMC, but is not part of the 15 administrative organs of the CMC. It is being envisioned as the Chinese version of the US DARPA, and is expected to steer the development of advanced dual-use technologies, giving a further boost to CMI. It is likely to focus on providing strategic technological guidance, identifying technology innovators in the commercial sector and connecting these nascent technologies to the PLA’s defence innovation network.

Complementary Roles

In summary, the above three organisations have complementary roles to play in the PLA’s defence innovation ecosystem. The CMI Commission, with President Xi at the helm, will be more effective in coordination of national CMI efforts; the S&T Commission will address bureaucratic and coordination issues within the PLA; and the Military Science Research Steering Committee will drive bottom-up military innovation rather than the traditional top-down approach, by identifying new commercial technologies for early absorption in defence applications.

Academic and Research Institutions

Military Institutions

China’s Academy of Military Science (AMS) was restructured in a major way as part of the second round of PLA reforms, termed as “below the neck” reforms and completed in 2017. Suitable changes were also brought about in the National Defense University (NDU) and the National University of Defense Technology (NUDT) [6].

The charter of the AMS, which reports directly to the CMC, has traditionally been to author academic publications such as the Science of Military Strategy and the China Military Science Journal, draft China’s defense white papers, and evolve military doctrine.

The most significant change was the merging into the AMS of six research institutes previously subordinate to the PLA’s former general departments. These six institutes, including the Military Medicine Institute, System Engineering Institute, and National Defense S&T Innovation Institute, are primarily focused on technical research. The main aim of this restructuring was to facilitate a blending of the AMS’s traditional focus on doctrine writing with new capabilities being developed by the science and technology (S&T) community, in line with the overall CMI strategy. Although the bureaucratic grade of AMS has technically been reduced by one level, the AMS continues to report to the CMC.

New personnel exchanges, funding schemes, and joint research projects now being organized by the AMS are all directed towards accelerating PLA modernization. During a July 2017 ceremony in which he conferred new flags to the AMS, NDU, and NUDT, President Xi urged the AMS to adapt to the “new requirements of military scientific work” and to build a “world-class military scientific research institution”. Given its new role, the AMS is well poised to emerge as a key technology incubator and provide a boost to military innovation.

Civil S&T Institutions

The National Science Foundation of China (NSFC), the China Academy of Sciences (CAS), and the Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) are key to S&T decision-making, funding and promoting basic and applied research, scientific innovation, and high-tech integration throughout China’s scientific, engineering, and civil-military industrial complex. The CAS, working closely with NSFC, is the highest academic institution for comprehensive R&D in the natural and applied sciences in China, with much of its work contributing to products for military use. It directs many research institutes, research programs, graduate training programs, and gives influential advice. The Chinese Academy of Engineering (CAE) gives important advice but unlike the CAS does not have research institutes of its own. The NSFC and CMC S&T Commission, key advisors on emerging and disruptive technologies, are presently collaborating on civil-military innovation and basic research for national defense. The national scientific and academic organizations affiliated to the China Association for Science and Technology are also important forces in scientific and technological research [7].

Noteworthy Features of the Chinese Defence R&D Enterprise

As stated at the outset, the motivation for this work is to identify and suggest measures which may be adopted by India to revitalise its defence R&D enterprise which has so far been largely unsuccessful. On reviewing the strategies which have been adopted by China in the recent past to give a boost to indigenous innovation, several noteworthy facets emerge which might find productive application in the Indian context, as listed below:-

• Vigorous Pursuit of CMI. The Chinese experience shows that even if a CMI strategy is adopted, it is not likely to be successful unless it is pursued with full vigour. It is only after President Xi elevated CMI to a national level strategy that, in conjunction with several national level plans, signs of positive outcomes are emerging.
• Apex Coordinating Body. Successful implementation of CMI requires transformative change spread across multiple organisations. Therefore, there is an imperative need for CMI to be steered by an apex level coordinating body which enjoys full authority. The CMI Commission, with President Xi at the helm, adequately meets this requirement.
• Adoption of DARPA Model. Across the world, the US DARPA model is renowned for its unique features and a reputation of churning out cutting edge technologies, both in the military and civil domains. It is characterised by being lean, flat, only a coordinating body with no captive research capabilities, manned by highly specialised professionals, and with a charter for taking on projects with an expected transformative (as against incremental) impact. Although shrouded in secrecy, China’s Military Science Research Steering Committee is seen to be modelled on the lines of DARPA.
• Acquisition of Foreign Technology. China’s overall strategy to acquire foreign technologies with the aim of circumventing the time and resources on researching technologies which has already been developed cannot be faulted. A multi-pronged approach has been adopted by China for executing this strategy. While illicit measures adopted by China, most notably industrial espionage, cannot be condoned, other measures are clearly worth emulating by any country wishing to become self-reliant in high-technology military systems.
• Focus on Disruptive Military Technologies. Chinese strategic thinkers have correctly envisioned that the nature of warfare is undergoing revolutionary changes in the 21st Century, and the Chinese military doctrine of “winning local wars under informationized/ intelligized conditions” reflects this understanding. In furtherance of this doctrine, China has been agile enough to bring about transformative reforms in the PLA, and has also focused its attention on development of disruptive military technologies which are expected to emerge on the 21st Century battlespace over the next few decades. The fact that most of these technologies are dual-use in nature are an added incentive for China to take this prudent step, since technology breakthroughs will simultaneously enhance their military as well as economic power.
• Military Research Institutions. Another of China’s noteworthy accomplishments was the reorganization of research institutes, which was carried out to ensure that military doctrine evolves in a timely manner to leverage the combat power which could accrue from emerging disruptive military technologies. Also, concept papers and doctrines which envision the operational employment of critical military technologies act as important catalysts for speedy development of military systems based on these technologies.

Conclusion

In this article, the China’s approach to defence innovation has been reviewed. The aspects which stand out the most are China’s CMI strategy, its many long term S&T development plans, and the transformative structural reforms carried out by it in recent years.

The next article in the series will briefly review the defence innovation strategies adopted by a few other countries which are leading players in state-of-the-art military technologies.

References

(1)    Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2019, US DOD Annual Report to Congress, Accessed 02 Aug 2020, https://media.defense.gov/2019/May/02/2002127082/-1/-1/1/2019_CHINA_MILITARY_POWER_REPORT.pdf, pp. 93-94.

(2)     Brian Hart, CSR 2019: Organizational Reform as a Key Driver of Chinese Military Science and Technology Innovation, The SAIS China Studies Review, 29 Oct 2019, Accessed 02 Aug 2020, https://saiscsr.org/2019/10/29/csr-2019-organizational-reform-as-a-key-driver-of-chinese-military-science-and-technology-innovation/.

(3)     Stephanie Segal and Dylan Gerstel, China’s Strategy to Become an Innovation Leader, Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 01 Sep 2019, Accessed 02 Aug 2020, https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep22585.5.pdf, pp. 4-6.

(4)     Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2019, US DOD Annual Report to Congress …., pp. 102-103.

(5)     Brian Hart, CSR 2019: Organizational Reform as a Key Driver of Chinese Military Science and Technology Innovation …

(6)     Joel Wuthnow, China’s “New” Academy of Military Science: A Revolution in Theoretical Affairs?  Publication: China Brief Volume: 19 Issue: 2, 18 Jan 2019, Accessed 02 Aug 2020, https://jamestown.org/program/chinas-new-academy-of-military-science-a-revolution-in-theoretical-affairs/.

(7)     Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2019, US DOD Annual Report to Congress …., pp. 97-98.