INFORMATION OPERATIONS
Cyber Skill Development in the Indian Armed Forces: An Exploratory Overview
The emergence of cyberspace as a formidable new domain of warfare in a multi-dimensional battlespace is a comparatively recent phenomenon. In view of this development, major world players have evolved national cyber security strategies and restructured their cyber organisations in order to adequately secure their respective national cyberspaces. This work is based on the author’s conviction that cyber governance in India needs to undergo a transformative restructuring with our Armed Forces at the helm, and that a full-fledged Cyber Command must be raised at the earliest. Assuming that approval for this is granted, a long lead time would be needed for steering the Command to full operational status. This is because, unlike other warfighting skills, training of cyber warriors is a highly complex task which cannot be accomplished in a compressed time-frame. This work gives an exploratory insight into the important issue of cyber skill development in the Indian Armed Forces.
China’s Strategic Support Force and its Implications for India – Part III
With the raising of the PLA Strategic Support Force (SSF), China has taken a very significant step forward towards operationalising its military doctrine of fighting and winning informationized wars. Creation of the SSF demonstrates China’s firm conviction that the Information domain has emerged as a daunting new arena of military conflict. In the earlier two parts of this three part series, an insight was given into the concept and broad organizational structure of the SSF, and how its space and IW capabilities have been reorganized. In this concluding part, we discuss how the SSF will fulfil its twin objectives of providing strategic information support and executing strategic information operations, highlight the implications of the creation of SSF on the Indian security scenario and list out the resulting imperatives which need to be urgently addressed by us.
China’s Strategic Support Force and its Implications for India – Part II
The Strategic Support Forces (SSF) serves to integrate the PLA’s strategic space, cyber, electronic and psychological warfare capabilities under a single organisation. In doing so it also effectively operationalises its two well-known hybrid warfare concepts, namely, Integrated Network Electronic Warfare (INEW) and Three Warfares (comprising of psychological, media and legal warfare). This work studies the concept underlying the reorganisation of the PLA’s space and IW capabilities under the SSF and its implications for India. In the first part of this three part series, an insight was given into the concept and broad organizational structure of the SSF, as also how its space assets have been reorganized. In this part, a look is taken at how the IW capabilities have been restructured under the SSF. It also briefly reviews the closely related intelligence and information processing functions, and how the raising of the SSF has affected them.
China’s Strategic Support Force and its Implications for India – Part I
The Strategic Support Force (SSF) was created as part of the reforms which were initiated by the PLA in 2015. The integration of strategic space, cyber, electronic and psychological warfare capabilities under the single umbrella of the SSF gives an insight into how the PLA plans to fight informationized wars of the 21st Century. The creation of the SSF is expected to considerably enhance the combat potential of the PLA as a result of increased synergy amongst its space and Information Warfare (IW) capabilities. This work analyses the concept, organisation and operational capabilities of the SSF. It goes on to compare the IW structures of China, United States and India, leading to some noteworthy conclusions and recommendations. In this first part of a three part series, an insight is given into the concept and broad organizational structure of the SSF, as also how its space assets have been re-organized.
Cyberspace Governance in India: Transform or Perish – Part III
This three part series on cyberspace governance in India seeks to analyse whether our existing organisational structures are adequately optimised to address the new challenges emerging in cyberspace, which is fast proving to be a daunting new domain of conflict amongst nations. The first two parts analysed cyber threats and cyber defence strategies, reviewed our existing cyberspace governance architecture and studied global practices adopted by the more agile nations for protecting their respective national cyberspaces. This concluding part proposes several transformative changes to our cyberspace organisational structures as well as to our HRD policies. It is felt that these changes must be implemented on priority if we are to shield ourselves from strategic threats which are imminent in cyberspace in this era of modern warfare.
Cyberspace Governance in India: Transform or Perish – Part II
With cyberspace having emerged as a new arena of conflict between nations, the more agile nations have brought about transformative changes in their cyber defence organisations. This three-part series analyses the important issue of cyber governance in India. The first part identified different types of cyber threats from the perspective of organising for cyberspace defence and discussed several cyber defence strategies which are relevant in the Indian context. This part first takes a look at our existing cyberspace governance architecture and analyses its shortcomings. It then reviews global practices for protecting national cyberspaces with a view to proposing suitable modifications for best addressing the national security challenges which we are being confronted with as a consequence of ever increasing conflicts in cyberspace.
Cyberspace Governance in India: Transform or Perish – Part I
Over the last decade or so, cyberspace has emerged as a new arena of conflict between nations. In order to address this challenge, the more agile nations have brought about transformative changes in their cyber defence organisations. In India, the two main agencies tasked with the defence of our National Cyberspace are the National Critical Information Infrastructure Protection Centre (NCIIPC), and the Computer Emergency Response Team – India (CERT-In). It needs to be analysed whether or not such an arrangement is the right apex structure for the defence of our cyberspace. This three-part series analyses the important issue of cyber governance in India. In this first part, a notional model of our National Cyberspace is first presented. It then identifies the different types of cyber threats from the perspective of organising for cyberspace defence and discusses several cyber defence strategies which are relevant in our context.
IW Structures for the Indian Armed Forces – Part IV
The first three parts of this four part series discussed the conceptual foundations of IW as also organizational structures which have been adopted by other armies. In this culminating part, an overview is first given of the IW organisations which presently exist at our national level as well as within the Indian Armed Forces. Thereafter, drawing upon concepts discussed in the preceding parts, a large number of recommendations are made on how organisational transformation may be carried out by us in order to effectively address the challenges emerging on the information-intensive battlefield of the 21st Century.
IW Structures for the Indian Armed Forces – Part III
Part I of this four part series dwelt upon terminologies, concepts and doctrines, and identified CO, EW and Psy W as the three primary components of IW. Part II analysed the areas of convergence as well as differences amongst these components, as also various facets of how these capabilities may be operationally deployed in an integrated manner. With the conceptual underpinnings of IW having thus been established, here we endeavour to briefly describe IW structures which presently exist in some of the defense forces of the world which are of relevance to us, specifically China, United States, Russia and Pakistan, with a view to drawing lessons and thence analysing our own structures against this backdrop.
IW Structures for the Indian Armed Forces – Part II
Part I of this four part series dwelt upon and clarified the terminologies, concepts and doctrines which this work uses as a basis for proposing effective and viable IW structures for the Indian Armed Forces. In this second part, the areas of convergence as well as differences amongst CO, EW and Psy W components of IO are first brought out. Thereafter, some considerations which determine the manner in which these capabilities are operationally deployed in an integrated manner are discussed.