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India’s poor self-reliance in the defence sector has long been a matter of concern, deserving serious introspection. This is the concluding article in a series written with the aim of suggesting structural reforms to India’s defence R&D ecosystem. Having reviewed the military modernisation strategies of the US, China, Russia, Israel and France in the previous three articles, this concluding article (in three parts) proposes an approach which is fundamentally different from existing practices, advocating that the Armed Forces must act as a pivot for driving the defence innovation process, and be suitably empowered accordingly; and in order to perform this role effectively, they must make transformative changes internally for efficiently managing high technology projects. Part I of this piece covered previous studies, certain core issues and our national innovation strategy. This part discusses the importance of technology, need for strategic guidance and existing structural shortcomings.

India was the second largest importer of arms in the world during the period 2014-19, and had a miniscule share of exports during the same period. India’s poor self-reliance in the defence sector has long been a matter of concern, deserving serious introspection. This is the concluding article in a series written with the aim of suggesting structural reforms to India’s defence R&D ecosystem. In the previous three articles of this series, the military modernisation strategies of the US, China, Russia, Israel and France were reviewed, and several features were identified which could perhaps be usefully adopted in the Indian context. In this piece (covered in three parts), an approach is presented which is fundamentally different from existing practices, built upon the following principles: firstly, the Armed Forces must act as a pivot for driving the defence innovation process, and be suitably empowered accordingly; and secondly, in order to perform this role effectively, they must make transformative changes internally for efficiently managing high technology projects.

India was the second larger importer of arms in the world during the period 2014-2019 with a share of 9.2%, and 82% of its imports are from Russia, Israel and France. On the other hand, its share of arms exports is a meagre 0.2%. It is evident that a serious introspection is needed to examine the reasons behind this uninspiring performance by the Indian DSTI sector. This is the third in a series of articles written with the aim of suggesting structural reforms to India’s defence industrial complex. In the previous two articles of this series, the defence innovation approaches of the US and China were reviewed, and several features were identified which could perhaps be usefully adopted in the Indian context. This piece is in continuation to “Defence Innovation Approaches of Russia, Israel and France – Part I”, and together they carry out a similar review for Russia, Israel and France, the three countries from which India imports most of its arms.

India was the second larger importer of arms in the world during the period 2014-2019, with a share of 9.2%, with 82% of its imports being from Russia, Israel and France. On the other hand, India’s share of international arms exports during the same period was only 0.2%. In contrast Israel, despite a GDP eight times lesser than that of India, has a share of international arms exports during the same period which was the eight highest in the world at 3% (15 times that of India). It is evident that a serious introspection is needed to examine the reasons behind this uninspiring performance by the Indian DSTI sector. This is the third in a series of articles written with the aim of suggesting structural reforms to India’s defence R&D ecosystem. In the previous two articles of this series, the defence innovation approaches of the US and China were reviewed, and several features were identified which could perhaps be usefully adopted in the Indian context. This article (in two parts) carries out a similar review for the three countries from which we import the major proportion of our military systems, namely, Russia, Israel and France.

Over the decades, India’s defense science, technology and industrial sector has by and large failed to deliver on the ground, barring a few notable successes. With the advent of highly sophisticated and disruptive military technologies such as AI & robotics, quantum, nano and hypersonic technologies on the 21st Century battlespace, the challenge of revitalising India’s defense industry is becoming an increasingly uphill task. This is the second in a series of articles written with the aim of suggesting structural reforms to India’s R&D enterprise. This piece (the second of two parts) analyses the Chinese approach to defence innovation and identifies features which could perhaps be usefully adopted in the Indian context. It is in continuation to “China’s Approach to Defence Innovation – Part I”, which covered the background, CMI integration strategy and national S&T development plans.

Over the decades, India’s defense science, technology and industrial sector has by and large failed to deliver on the ground, barring a few notable successes. With the advent of highly sophisticated and disruptive military technologies such as AI & robotics, quantum, nano and hypersonic technologies on the 21st Century battlespace, the challenge of revitalising India’s defense industry is becoming an increasingly uphill task. The uninspiring performance of our DSTI sector has been a matter of much debate over the years, and despite honest past efforts by the Government to energize it, there has been little discernible improvement. This is the second in a series of articles written with the aim of suggesting structural reforms to India’s R&D enterprise. In the previous piece, several features of the US R&D ecosystem were identified which could perhaps be usefully adopted in the Indian context. This article (in two parts) carries out a similar review for China.

Over the decades, India’s defense science, technology and industrial sector has by and large failed to deliver on the ground, barring a few notable successes. The uninspiring performance by India so far in indigenising defence technology is only expected to worsen in the coming with the advent of highly sophisticated and disruptive military technologies on the 21st century battlespace. Much has been written over the years on bringing about transformative changes to India’s military industrial complex. The current series of articles is another effort in the same direction, but with a difference: this work adopts an introspective approach from the standpoint of the Defence Services, based on the conviction that the main impediments to bringing about the desired transformative change are to be found within the Services. In this first article of the series, the R&D eco-system of the US is reviewed, with the aim of identifying features which may be adapted usefully in the Indian context. Subsequent write-ups will carry out a similar analysis for other countries which lead the race in military technologies, notably China. The series will culminate by suggesting structural changes to the Indian defence R&D set-up, with focus on initiatives to be taken by the Defence Services.